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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
REMINGTON RAND, INC., a cor-
poration, 
Respondent and Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THURMAN E. O'NEIL and LOIS S. 
MACHADO, fdba A-1 TYPEWRIT-
ER COMPANY, Case No. 8379 
Defendants, 
-vs.-
DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH 
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a 
corporation, 
Appellants and Garnishee Defendants. 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND ~fOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT 
THE RECORD, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondent, Remington Rand, Inc., a corporation, 
petitions the Court for a rehearing in this case upon the 
grounds hereinafter set forth. 
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:RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND 
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
Respondent, under Rules 4 (h) .and 5 (a), U. R. C. P., 
moves the Court for leave to amend the record and, un-
der Rule 75 (h), U. R. C. P., to supplement the record 
as hereinafter set forth: 
1. To amend the record by inserting a Certificate 
of Mailing on its Reply to Answers of Garnishees (R 34), 
which Certificate was omitted by inadvertence and mis-
take. The Certificate reads as follows: 
"Served the foregoing Reply to Answers of 
Garnishees by mailing a copy thereof to Dale E. 
Grant and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., 
153 East Second South, Salt Lake City, Utah and 
to Thurman E. O'Neil, 122¥2 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of April, 1955. 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW 
By jsj Allen M. Swan" 
2. To supplement the record by designation to the 
Clerk of the lower court to certify to the Supreme Court 
the transcript of proceedings in the trial court on May 
2, 1955, when appellants moved the trial court to vacate 
dnd set aside its judgment. The existence of stenographic 
notes of the entire proceedings was not known by re-
spondent at the time of the designation of the original 
record and said transcript is necessary and material to 
the proper decision of the Court in that it reveals that 
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appellants had actual notice of respondent's Reply to 
Answers of Garnishees prior to trial. 
In support of s.aid Petition and Motion, respondent 
relies upon the following points : 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT DID NOT GIVE PRO-
PER WEIGHT TO THE FACTS AND PERMISSIBLE IN-
FERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE RECORD, SINCE 
SUCH RECORD, TOGETHER WITH ADMISSIONS IN AP-
PELLANTS' BRIEF, CLEARLY REVEAL THAT APPEL-
LANTS HAD BOTH ACTUAL NOTICE, AND IMPUTED 
NOTICE, OF 'THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT DID NOT OFFER PROOF OF SERVICE 
OF ITS REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES ON 'TRIAL, 
SINCE IT MISTAKENLY BELIEVED SUCH PROOF WAS 
IN THE RECORD AND SINCE APPELLANTS RAISED NO 
OBJECTION TO TRIAL UPON THE MERITS, AND, UNDER 
') 
SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT HAS POWER TO 
PERMIT AMENDMENT OF PROOF OF SERVICE UNDER 
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4 (h) AND RULE 5 (a), U. R. 
C. P., TO SHOW THE TRUE FACTS. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S DECISION FOLLOWED FROM ITS FIND-
ING THAT APPELLANTS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES AND SINCE THE 
REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD REVEALS AP-
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4 
PELLANTS, IN TRUTH, HAD SUCH KNOWLEDGE, THE 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD SHOULD BE 
GRANTED UNDER RULE 75 (h), U. R. C. P., SO THAT 
ALL FACTS ARE BEFORE THE COURT. 
WHEREFORE, respondent prays that its petition 
for rehearing and its motion to amend and supplement the 
record be granted and that upon such rehearing, and 
after consideration of the complete factual record, and 
all inferences therein, the decision of the Court be re-
called, .and the judgement of the lower court affirmed. 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW 
& CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND MOTION 
TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
By its reversal of the judgment on appeal, this Court 
upheld appellants' claim that they had no notice of a 
document entitled Reply to Answers of Garnishees prior 
to the trial in the lower court, and that appellants thereby 
had no notice of the issues which were to be tried. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Respondent does not dispute the principle of law 
announced by the Court, but we earnestly contend that 
the principle has no proper application in this case, in 
view of the facts and inferences in the record already 
certified to this Court. It is believed the Court did not 
fully realize the significance of many facts and that 
on the former hearing and in the Brief, we did not ef-
fectively direct the Court's attention to the inesc.apable 
factual inferences to be found in this record. 
In order to remedy this situation, and to prevent 
a manifest injustice, the following argument is respect-
fully submitted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT DID NOT GIVE 
PROPER WEIGHT TO THE FACTS AND PERMISSIBLE IN-
FERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE RECORD, SINCE 
SUCH RECORD, TOGETHER WITH ADMISSIONS IN AP-
PELLANTS' BRIEF, CLEARLY REVEAL THAT APPEL-
LANTS HAD BOTH ACTUAL NOTI·CE, AND IMPUTED 
NOTICE, OF THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
II. RESPONDENT DID NOT OFFER PROOF OF SER-
VICE OF ITS REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES ON 
TRIAL, SINCE IT MISTAKENLY BELIEVED SUCH PROOF 
WAS IN THE RECORD AND SINCE APPELLANTS RAISED 
NO OBJECTION TO TRIAL UPON THE MERITS, AND, 
UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT HAS POWER 
TO PERMIT AMENDMENT OF PROOF OF SERVICE UN-
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DER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4 (h) AND RULE 5' (a), 
U. R. C. P., TO SHOW THE TRUE FA·CTS. 
III. 'THE COURT'S DECISION FOLLOWED FROM ITS 
FINDING THAT APPELLANTS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES AND SINCE 
THE REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD REVEALS 
APPELLANTS, IN TRUTH, HAD SUCH KNOWLEDGE, THE 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD SHOULD BE 
GRANTED UNDER RULE 75 (h), U. R. C. P., SO THAT ALL 
FA•CTS ARE BEFORE THE COURT. 
ARGUl\1:ENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT DID NOT GIVE PRO-
PER WEIGHT TO THE FACTS AND PERMISSIBLE IN-
FERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE RECORD, SINCE 
SUCH RECORD, TOGE'THER WI'TH ADMISSIONS IN AP-
PELLANTS' BRIEF, CLEARLY REVEAL THAT APPEL-
LANTS HAD BOTH ACTUAL NOTICE, AND IMPUTED 
NOTICE, OF 'THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
The decision of the Court states in part: 
"Although a reply to answer of garnishee was 
filed, and it was admitted that it was actually 
served on ... O'Neil, there was no proof ... that 
such service was made on the garnishees herein, 
nor was there any evidence that they had any 
knowledge of it, or its contents before the hear-
ing." 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court did not 
consider the cumulative effect of the many factors in the 
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record which, when considered together, clearly reveal 
that appellants had both actual and imputed notice of 
our Reply. 
A summary of these factors includes the following: 
(a) The notice of the garnishment hearing in-
formed both appellants that the purpose of the he.aring 
was "to determine the indebtedness, if any, due Thurman 
E. O'Neil by ... " the appellants. 
Obviously, Grant, acting for himself and the cor-
porate appellant, took this notice to appellants' attorney. 
It is equally obvious that counsel knew what answers 
were filed by the garnishees, since the answers were pre-
pared on his typewriter and were sworn before him as 
Notary Public long before a Reply was filed (R 15). 
The answers revealed no indebtedness. When counsel 
received the notice of hearing, he, as a lawyer, was at 
once on notice that he would be required to meet the 
issue of .a claimed indebtedness. Under present rules, 
many complaints in civil actions contain no more than an 
allegation of indebtedness and if the defendant desires to 
know more than that, discovery procedures are open to 
him. 
(b) While it is true that Grant was subpoenaed as 
a witness by plaintiff, the record reveals he was never 
called by plaintiff. After plaintiff rested, Grant, with-
out any objection, took the stand as a party ordinarily 
does, to refute respondent's case. 
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Further, the subpoena served on Grant required him 
to bring to court books, records and checks reflecting 
the payments made by him or the Utah Cash Register 
Exchange to O'Neil. A cursory examination of this sub-
poena by counsel obviously showed him that a hearing 
encompassing the past transactions between O'Neil and 
appellants would be conducted. 
(c) Appellants received notice of the hearing 13 
days in advance and were served with subpoena two days 
before the he.aring, yet they would _have the Court be-
lieve they or their counsel made no effort to examine 
the file in the District Court despite the matters described 
in paragraphs (a) and (b). 
(d) In addition to the above factors, appellants say, 
on page 5 of their brief, that they knew of the existence 
of the Reply filed by respondent although "its exact 
contents were not known to them prior to the hearing.'' 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Appellants are "hedging". Their statement is eva-
sive and equivocal. By claiming not to know the "exact" 
contents of the Reply, they cannot escape the doctrine 
of imputed notice. As stated in 66 Corpus Juris Secun-
dum, Notice, Section 11, " ... a person who has notice of 
facts which would cause a reasonably prudent person 
to inquire as to further f.acts is chargeable with notice 
of the further facts discoverable by proper inquiry ... " 
Courts have applied this doctrine to do equity and 
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to prevent injustice. It is ordinarily found in cases where 
it would be "unconscionable ... to permit ... " a party 
to assert he had no notice. 66 C.J.S., Notice, Section 11 b. 
In the present case, .appellants never gave the slight-
est indication they were unaware of the contents of the 
Reply until after the Sheriff had levied upon them pur-
suant to the garnishee judgment. It would be uncon-
scionable to permit them now to assert successfully that 
they didn't know the "exact" contents of the Reply and 
thereby, to avoid the judgment and levy. 
(e) Although Grant claims he appeared on trial 
only as a witness, it is ·significant that he appeared with 
counsel and sat at the opposite side of counsel table with 
his counsel just as any party sits with his lawyer in the 
trial of a contested matter. Direct and cross examination 
of the witnesses was conducted in the same fashion as 
in any trial. The record of trial is totally barren of any 
claim of surprise or objection to the proceedings. No 
continuance was asked. No objection was made that the 
evidence sought to be elicited was immaterial or irrele-
vant, or otherwise beyond the scope of issues counsel 
obviously intended to meet. 
Finally, although appellants now vigorously assert 
to this Court, through their counsel, that they didn~t 
know they were to participate in a trial, that Grant ap-
peared only as a witness, and that it w.as only later that 
they realized a trial had occurred, the record reveals 
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Mr. Fuller stated: "We rest, Your Honor." (emphasis 
supplied) (R 93). 
(f) A close examination of the questions asked by 
appellants' counsel on cross examination of respondent's 
witnesses .and direct examination of his own witnesses 
clearly reveals an intimate knowledge of the business 
affairs of all the parties to this suit and of matters and 
issues being tried by the court and a genuine attempt 
to meet these issues. 
(g) Appellants' contention before this Court that 
they were "dumbfounded" and unaware of what was hap-
pening in the lower court is ridiculous in the face of 
the following colloquy between court and counsel at the 
beginning of the hearing (R 40): 
"MR. SWAN: Your Honor, Mr. O'Neil is not 
in court today. The party against whom we are 
asking a garnishee judgment is here, Mr. Grant, 
Dale Grant, whose .attorney is representing also 
today Utah Cash Register Exchange, a corpora-
tion. 
"THE COURT: Well, you are not taking 
anything personally against Mr. Grant. 
"MR SWAN: Yes, Your Honor, we are. We 
have prayed for judgment in the .alternative, either 
Mr. Grant or the corporation. 
"THE COURT: He hasn't been garnished, 
has he! 
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"MR. SWAN : Yes. I think your file will 
show two garnishments, Your Honor, one against 
the corporate defendant and one against Grant 
personally. 
"THE COURT: Oh, yes, I see; and what does 
he answer personally? That he owed nothing? 
"Mr. SWAN: They both answered that they 
were not in debt. 
"MR. FULLER: However, they answered 
they had some goods belonging to O'Neil in their 
possession, and we disclaimed interest in those. 
"THE COURT: Dale E. Grant has answered, 
'No, except as stated in answers to garnishment 
served on the Utah Cash Register Exchange, and 
in that Dale E. Grant doesn't claim to be indebted. 
"MR. FULLER: Dale Grant is president of 
the Utah Cash Register Exchange. 
~'THE COURT : Yes, and if they can show 
that he holds any property, I suppose judgment 
would be taken against him here, and you propose 
to do that as against the individual? 
"MR. SWAN: If it is the judge's decision 
that he does owe property rather than cash or 
rather than indebtedness, yes. 
"THE COURT: You may proceed to try to 
show what that is then." 
It will be noted that Mr. Swan commented that Mr. 
Fuller, .attorney for the appellants, was in court and was 
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representing not only Mr. Grant, but the Ut.ah Cash 
Register Exchange. Mr. Fuller made no objection to 
this statement but would now have us believe he ap-
peared only as counsel for Grant, as a witness. The 
quoted colloquy, together with the record of appearances 
of counsel (R 39), conclusively disproves counsel's pre-
sent contention. 
Then, it should be noted that Mr. Swan stated he 
was .asking judgment in the alternative against either 
Mr. Grant or the corporation. After further colloquy 
between court and counsel concerning the proposed plan 
of attack to be followed by plaintiff, the court stated, 
". . . I suppose judgment would be taken against him 
(Grant) here ... " (R 41). 
(h) The record, at page 55, and page 64, reveals 
appellants' counsel knew enough about the issues being 
tried to question witnesses concerning another pending 
case involving defendant O'Neil, in an effort to refute 
respondent's theories. It is difficult to see how counsel 
could have been better prepared than in this case. 
(i) There is no showing made that appellants' posi-
tion or proof would have been different on any other 
hearing of these issues. We submit that unless prejudice 
is shown, appellants have not sustained the burden im-
posed upon them to overcome the presumptively correct 
decision of the lower court. 
In summary, respondent contends that appellants' 
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outraged cry of "lack of notice" is mere afterthought, 
to escape the levy which followed judgment. We sub-
mit that parties to litigation too often submit to trial 
court action without objection, with no request for con-
tinuance, with no claim of surprise or prejudice, and 
when the decision is adverse, produce a carefully con-
cealed "ace in the hole" to win a lost cause. Courts ought 
not to countenance such conduct. 
If, as appears clear from the record, appellants had 
actual notice, they should fail in their contention now. 
If they knew only that a Reply was in existence, but did 
not le.arn its "exact" contents, they still should fail, for 
where " . . . facts put a person on inquiry, notice will 
be imputed to him if he designedly abstains from inquiry 
for the purpose of avoiding notice ... " 66 C. J. S., 
Notice, Section 11. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT DID NOT OFFER PROOF OF SERVICE 
OF ITS REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES ON TRIAL, 
SINCE IT MISTAKENLY BELIEVED SUCH PROOF WAS 
IN THE RECORD AND SINCE APPELLANTS RAISED NO 
OBJECTION TO TRIAL UPON THE MERITS, AND, UNDER 
SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT HAS POWER TO 
PERMIT AMENDMENT OF PROOF OF SERVICE UNDER 
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4 (h) AND RULE 5 (a), U. R. 
C. P., TO SHOW THE TRUE FACTS. 
The record reve.als that when the trial court reached 
this matter on its calenda~, the parties proceeded to in-
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quire into all phases of the matter without objection. 
Respondent made no attempt to prove that it had served 
the Reply to Answer of Garnishees on the appellants 
because counsel for respondent believed that a Certificate 
of Mailing to these partie.s was a part of the Reply and 
was in the record. His belief in this regard was strength-
ened by the f.act that no objection was made and no re-
quest was made for a continuance. 
As all lawyers know, there are many times when, 
in response to a complaint, an adverse party appears in 
court and, if no question is raised concerning the service 
of a summons or the entry of an appearance, the party 
is deemed to be "before the court" and no proof of ser-
vice is offered, even if available, and such a defendant 
will not be heard later to say that he had no notice of 
the nature of the proceedings. 
Since appellants now strenuously complain that they 
had no notice and since counsel for respondent distinctly 
recalls having prepared copies of the Reply for them and 
recalls having had prepared envelopes in which such 
copies were to be mailed, we now seek to amend the re-
cord by inserting a Certificate of Mailing as indicated in 
the Motion hereinbefore set forth. 
This proposed Certificate of Mailing is in accord 
with the statements made to the Supreme Court by coun-
sel upon oral argument, which statement would not have 
been made to the Court in response to Mr. Justice Wade's 
question if in fact no service by mail had been accom-
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plished. As the Court is no doubt aware, counsel for re-
spondent are not in the habit of making untrue state-
ments to the Supreme Court or to any court. 
vV e view the Certificate of :Mailing and the Reply 
to Answers of Garnishees as a form of process, in view 
of the provisions of Rule 5 (a), U.R.C.P., which states, 
in part: 
" ... that pleadings asserting new or addi-
tional claims for relief ... shall be served ... 
in the manner provided for service of summons 
in Rule 4." 
Rule 4 (h), U.R.C.P., provides: 
"At any time in its discretion and upon such 
terms as it deems just, the Court may .allow any 
process or proof of service thereof to be amended 
" 
While decisions construing Rule 4 (h) are not nume-
rous, our research indicates that the rule receives a 
liberal interpretation in order that the record will con-
form to fact. Wieland & Son v. Wickard, 68 Fed. Supp. 
93, 4 Fed. Rule Dec. 250 (E. D. Wise., 1945) involved a 
matter wherein service of process was required to be 
made upon the Secretary of Agriculture by delivering 
to him a copy of the complaint. Plaintiff's complaint 
was filed with the clerk with the request that no summons 
be issued, but that the defendant be served by mailing 
from the office of the United States l\Iarshal. No sum-
mons was issued and no proof of mailing was _in the file. 
The Court said: 
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"In my opinion the court is authorized under 
Rule 4h to allow the necessary procedural amend-
ments in order that the merits of the plaintiff's 
claim may be adjudicated.*** 
"It will be noted that under the rule the 
power to allow amendments is not limited in point 
of time and that it exists with reference 'to any 
process' which manifestly includes such as is 
legally defective. The power to amend, however, 
is limited. As observed in Gagnon v. U. 8., 193 
U. S. 451, 456, 24 S. Ct. 510, 511, 48 L. Ed. 7 45, 
the power to amend must not be confounded with 
the power to create. It presupposes an existing 
record, which is defective by reason of some 
clerical error or mistake, or the omission of some 
entry which should have been made during the 
progress of the case, or by the loss of some docu-
ment originally filed therein. The. difference be-
tween creating and amending the record is anal-
gous to that between the construction and repair 
of a piece of personal property." 
It is true that the Wieland case treats the proof of 
mailing of a complaint as "proof of service of process." 
In the instant case, "proof of service of process," quite ac-
curately describes the proposed amendment which re-
spondent by its motion to amend seeks at this time. The 
absence of the Certificate of :Mailing on the Reply con-
stitutes "an omission of some entry which should have 
been made during the progress of the case," or perhaps 
even more accurately, "some clerical error or mistake." 
A similar result w.as reached in the case of Burdick 
v. Powell Brothers, 91 Fed. Supp. 12 124 Fed. 2d 694, 
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1 Fed. Rule Dec. 220 (N.D., Ill., 1940). The question 
was not discussed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but 
the United States District Court for Illinois permitted 
an amendment to cure a defect in the affidavit of service 
of summons. 
In the case of English v. Smith, 259 P. 2d 857 (1953), 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming allowed ,an amendment 
to the record after the dismissal of an appeal, to correct 
.an erroneous date entered by the Clerk of the District 
Court. In its decision the Court said: 
"Generally a record cannot be amended after 
dismissal of an appeal, but there are exceptions 
to the general rule. * * * 
"It appears to be a matter of discretion here 
for this Court, in McGinnis v Beatty (citing case) 
commented, 'though we hold that the Court has 
jurisdiction after an order dismissing an appeal 
for a defect in the record, to grant a motion to 
permit an amendment of the record filed in con-
nection with a motion to reinstate on a petition 
for a rehearing it should not be understood that 
such a motion then filed for the first time will be 
granted in all cases or as a matter of right, but 
whether it will or ought to be granted must depend 
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case as affecting the right to amend, in view of the 
delay in the application, in addition to the showing 
ordinarily necessary to justify the return of a 
record for amendment.' " 
So far as we can determine by use of Shepard's 
Citator, these cases have not been overruled or success-
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fully attacked, and respondent asserts that the principle 
of the cases is correct, particularly in view of the langu-
age of Rule 4 (h), which permits the court to allow such 
amendments "at any time in its discretion." Such word-
ing clearly does not limit an amendment to a time prior 
to the decision of the Supreme Court, and where, as here, 
the record ought to be amended so that the true and com-
plete facts are before the Supreme Court, we submit that 
the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, should grant 
the motion to allow insertion of the Certificate of Mail-
ing on respondent's Reply to Answers of Garnishees. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S DECISION FOLLOWED FROM ITS FIND-
ING THAT APPELLANTS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES AND SINCE THE 
REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL REoCORD REVEALS AP-
PELLANTS, IN TRUTH, HAD SUCH KNOWLEDGE, 'THE 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD SHOULD BE 
GRANTED UNDER RULE 75 (h), U. R. C. P., SO THAT 
ALL FACTS ARE BEFORE THE COURT. 
The supplemental record which respondent desires 
the Court to consider consists of a seven-page transcript 
of proceedings reflecting what transpired on May 2, 
1955 when appellants' motion to vacate and set aside 
the garnishee judgment came on for hearing. 
Respondent informs this Court that at the time the 
original record was designated on appeal, it was unaware 
that the court reporter in the trial court had taken steno-
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graphic notes of the colloquy between court and counsel 
when appellants' motion came on for hearing May 2, 1955. 
Following the decision of this Court, inquiry was made 
of the court reporter, who at first .advised no such notes 
had been taken, but who subsequently informed respon-
dent's counsel that she had in fact taken notes of all 
matters except legal argument, and a transcript was ac-
cordingly prepared. 
Counsel for respondent were not aware of the import 
of the statements by appellants' counsel until this tran-
script was prepared, and it was therefore impossible for 
it to have been made a part of the original record. 
The more significant portions of this transcript in-
clude an exchange between court and counsel wherein 
it clearly appears that counsel for appellants had know-
ledge of the Reply to Answers of Garnishees before the 
trial in the lower court. This exchange is as follows: 
"MR. FULLER: Well, Your Honor, in this 
matter our position is simply that there was no 
reply ever served pursuant to the rules on the de-
fendant. 
"THE COURT : It may have been, and he 
would have been entitled to it. He could have had 
it at that time, but he didn't call my attention to 
it and didn't seem to be none the worse for the 
battle. 
"MR. FULLER: Well, the matter of fact 
is we take the position that the judgment that was 
rendered exceeded what could have been granted 
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under the circumstances. We felt that it sh~ould be 
limited to the matter set forth in the reply. If you 
will recall and will check the record, the defendant 
was called to court on a subpoena. He had no at-
torney prior to that time. 
"THE COURT: Didn't he have .an attorney 
in here that day~ 
"MR. FULLER: I was here that day. 
"THE COURT: Yes. 
"MR. FULLER: Prior to that time. And I 
specifically asked the witness Snyder - now, I 
had knowledge that there was a reply and answer. 
It was served on O'Neil and also on his attorney. 
And I specifically asked Snyder at that hearing 
whether they were trying to assert a fifty per 
cent ownership as set forth in that reply, and he 
said absolutely, there was no such an understand-
ing. 
"THE COURT: I ruled against him on that, 
didn't I~ 
"MR. FULLER : Pardon~ 
"THE COURT: Didn't I rule .against him on 
thatf 
"MR. FULLER: You didn't have to rule 
on that. 
"THE COURT: Oh. 
"MR. FULLER: And I assumed at that time 
that they were not then proceeding on the basis 
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of this so-called reply that had been filed; and 
when Your Honor ruled on this alter ego busi-
ness, I think that far exceeded what was set forth 
in the notice that came out. I think Your Honor 
shouldn't have ruled as you did because I don't 
believe we were fully apprised of that aspect of 
the proceedings. In any event, I think there was 
enough surprise that came into the matter that 
we didn't really know which theory they were 
proceeding on at the hearing." (Italics ours) 
This exchange makes it clear that counsel for ap-
pellants not only knew that there was a reply prior to 
the hearing, but knew of its contents. Mr. Fuller men-
tions the partnership theory, states that he asked the 
witness Snyder at the hearing concerning the theory, re-
ceived an answer which apparently disproved the exist-
ence of a partnership and then ".assumed that the plain-
tiff was not proceeding on the basis of the reply that had 
been filed." 
The rule on which respondent relies as a basis to 
supplement the record is Rule 75 (h), U.R.C.P., the mater-
ial portions of which read as follows: 
"If anything material to either party is omit-
ted from the record on appeal by error or acci-
dent ... the Suprrme Court on a proper sugges-
tion, or on its own initiative, may direct that the 
omission . . . shall be corrected and if necessary 
that a supplemental record shall be certified and 
transmitted by the Clerk of the District Court." 
This rule is substantially the same as Federal Rule 
75 (h), which has been construed by the courts to allow a 
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. record to be supplemented in order to include any por-
tion of the proceedings in the lower court which may 
be material or necessary to a proper disposition of the 
case on appeal. 
This Court has construed Rule 75 (h) in the case 
of Boskovich v. Utah Construction Company, 259 P. 2d 
885 ( 1953). In that case this Court allowed a correc-
tion of the record to show a certain statement of the 
trial court at the time of hearing. The Court stated, at 
page 888 : "The correction of the record was properly 
made even though not made until after the record had 
been transmitted on appeal to this court, under the 
authority of Rule 75 (h) which was purposely made 
broad enough by the Committee on Rules to cover any 
situation requiring remedial action to present a com-
plete and accurate record of proceedings below." 
The Boskovich case cites with approval Dempsey v. 
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 131 F. 2d 103, 
wherein the Circuit Court of the 7th Circuit states: 
"It is clear that the purpose of this part of 
Rule 75 (75 h) was to provide a simple method 
of adding to the record on appeal any matter pro-
perly a part thereof which had been omitted there-
from by error or accident, and that such addition 
would be made even .after the record had been 
transmitted to the court of appeals. The rule, 
however, was never intended to permit the ad-
dition of. matter not before the District Court 
when he entered his order." 
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The Arizona Supreme Court has construed its Rule 
which appears to be identical to Federal Rule 75 (h) in 
the case of Hughes v. Young, 123 P. 2d 396, 138 A.L.R. 
943, .and states the following: 
"This is a provision of the new rules which 
was intended to obviate the necessity of a judg-
ment being affirmed on account of the fact that 
a complete record of the proceedings in the lower 
court was not before this court, when, if such re-
cord was brought up, it would show that the 
judgment should be reversed. The rule is ob-
viously in the interest of justice and to permit 
affirmance due to the inadvertence of counsel in 
completing the record in this court and should 
be liberally construed, but there are limits to its 
application. We may by virtue thereof have any 
records of proceedings of the lower court which 
has been omitted from the court on appeal, 
brought before us at any time if we think it is 
necessary in order to do justice on the merits of 
the case, but we may not supply evidence which 
was never presented to the lower court even 
though it may be that such evidence is in existence 
somewhere." (italics ours). 
The rule has also been construed to .allow the record 
to be corrected where, as here, the decision of the appell-
ate court has already been rendered. 
American Chemical Paint Company v. Dow Chemical 
Company, 164 F. 2d 208 (Cir. Ct. of App. 6th, 1947), is 
a case in which a p.arty moved for a correction of the 
record at the time a petition for rehearing was filed, 
which motion .asked for the Circuit Court to order the 
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District Court to certify a transcript of a proceeding had 
in the lower court, in which the appellant allegedly 
waived a p.articular question of law by the admission of 
its counsel. In that case the proceedings deemed material 
were not a part of the original transcript of the_ record 
when the appeal was considered due to the fact that the 
parties stipulated in prep.aring the record on appeal that 
it be omitted. The appellate court entered an order sub-
sequent to its decision and opinion that the oral argument 
in the court below appeared material to the disposition of 
the appeal, and that pursu.ant to the provisions of Rule 
75 (h), Rules of Civil Procedure, a supplemental record 
containing a transcript of the argument be certified and 
transmitted by the Clerk of the District Court to the 
Clerk of the Circuit Court. The appellant contended 
that the supplemental record was not properly before 
the Circuit Court, the .argument being that Rule 75 (h) 
permitted the appellate court to order a supplemental 
record if anything material to either party "is omitted 
from the record on appeal by error or accident, or is 
misstated therein," and that none of those conditions 
existed in that the omission of the transcript of .argu-
ment was deliberate and by agreement. The Circuit 
Court stated: 
"We believe that the rule is broad enough to 
cover a case of this kind, and that when the part-
ies, acting in good faith in .an attempt to eliminate 
portions of the record erroneously believed at the 
time to be irrevelant, have omitted a portion of 
the record considered by the appellate court to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
be material to a proper disposition of the appeal, 
the court may direct that the omitted portion be 
supplied in order to make a proper disposition of 
the question presented." 
In the light of these authorities, there can be no 
doubt that the Court has the power, and, indeed the duty, 
to require the supplemental record to be brought before 
it. 
If this be done, there will remain no doubt that the 
parties knew what the issues were, that the matter was 
fully tried without objection or claim of surprise, and 
the issues were investigated and tried by the trial judge 
as thoroughly as could have been done under any circum-
stances. 
In support of the lower court, it should be noted 
that, contrary to the assertion in appellants' brief (page 
10), the court did not rule peremptorily, but heard argu-
ment after a recess, before the decision was announced. 
In this argument, appellants at no time raised the ob-
jections which are now so thoroughly asserted. 
As Mr. Justice Cardozo stated, in Doty v. Love, 295 
U. S. 64, 79 L. Ed. 1303 ( 1934) : 
"Finally the appellants say that the proceed-
ings in the court of chancery are void, for insuf-
ficient notice to the depositors and others. A suf-
ficient answer is that the appellants appeared 
generally and were fully heard upon the merits." 
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It is respondent's position that the appearance by 
appellants at the hearing and their complete and whole-
hearted participation therein without objection before, 
during or .after the evidence was heard, constituted a 
waiver of any defect which may have occurred in· pro-
cedures prior to that time. 1 
We have mentioned waiver at this point in the argu-
ment because it is our earnest belief that the proposed 
supplemental record amply emphasizes that appellants 
did not make objection because they did not find any-
thing objectionable until they experienced the weight of 
judgment and a levy of goods thereunder. 
Since the supplemental transcript clearly shows that 
counsel for appellants not only knew of the existence of 
the Reply, but w.as aware of the theories contained in it, 
the Court ought to grant the motion to supplement the 
record so that its decision will not be based upon half 
truths, but will clearly reflect all matters on which the 
trial court's judgment depended. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's decision in this case quotes an excerpt 
from National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co., 
v. Thompson, ______ Utah ______ , 286 P. 2d 249, which states, 
in part, ". . . if an issue is to be tried and a party's 
rights concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice 
thereof and an opportunity to meet it." 
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That comment referred to Rule 15 (b), U.R.C.P., 
and the Court noted that, contrary to the rule, there was 
no "express or implied assent" to try the issue of value. 
This is not such a case. The quoted principle is 
good law, but is not the controlling principle here, where 
both the original record, and the proposed supplement, 
show clearly an implied consent to try the issues involved. 
The principle applicable in the present case is to be 
found in the portion of Rule 54 (c) ( 1), quoted also by 
this Court in Morris v. Russell, 236 P. 2d 451: " ... every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party 
... is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings ... " 
The trial judge here obviously granted the relief 
he thought the evidence required. He was faced with 
no objections of any kind regarding notice. This Court's 
insistence that he nevertheless committed reversible error 
would result in most substantial injustice, and the deci-
sion of the Court should therefore be recalled and the 
entire matter reheard. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW 
& CHRISTENSEN 
JOHN H. SNOW 
.Attorneys for Respondent 
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